Score Manipulation Imputation
Our imputation is closely related to that used by INVALSI and described in Quintano et al. (2009) . INVALSI assigns a manipulation probability to each class in three steps.
The first step computes the following four summary statistics.
(1) Within-class average score
where p ji denotes the score of student j in class i; N i denotes the number of test-takers in class i.
(2) Within-class standard deviation of scores
(3) Within-class average percent missing
where M ji is the fraction of test items skipped by student j in class i.
(4) Within-class index of answer homogeneity
where q = 1, .., Q indexes test items and E qi is a Gini measure of homogeneity that equals value zero if all students in class i provide the same answer to item q. This can be interpreted as the Herfindahl index of the share of students with similar response patterns in the class.
In the second step, the first two principal components are extracted from the 4 × 4 correlation matrix determined by these indicators, yielding a percentage of explained variance which is -across years, subjects and grades -well above 90%. Denote these principal components by ψ 1i and ψ 2i . The third step consists of a cluster analysis that creates G groups from the distribution of (ψ 1i , ψ 2i ). INVALSI sets G = 8, yielding a matrix whose elements are, for each class, eight group membership probabilities. This procedure is known as "fuzzy clustering" (see Bezdek, 1981) , since data elements (classes, in our setting) can be assigned to one or more groups. With "hard clustering", data elements belong to exactly one cluster.
INVALSI identifies likely manipulators as those in the group with values of (ψ 1i , ψ 2i ) that are most extreme (see Figure 8 in Quintano et al. 2009 ). In practice, the suspicious group is characterized by (i) abnormally large values ofp i , and (ii) small values of
relative to the population average of these indicators. This group is flagged as the "outlier"
or manipulating cluster. The INVALSI manipulation indicator gives, for each class, the membership probability for this cluster. Our hard clustering computations codes a dummy for manipulating classes. This dummy indicates classes whose values of (ψ 1i , ψ 2i ) belong to the manipulating cluster identified by INVALSI.
Manipulation and Class Size
Class size is denoted by s and, in the absence of manipulation, the score on item j is L j ∈ [0, 1].
Manipulated scores are equal to 1. The manipulated class average score on item j is therefore
is the fraction of score sheets manipulated for item j and n j is number of score sheets manipulated for item j. The score gain from manipulation is τ j p j ,
Large τ j denotes difficult items, so the returns to manipulation vary with item difficulty. Discovery risk cumulates across items, γ(s) h n h , with γ(s) increasing in class size: γ (s) > 0. Assuming teachers care about total scores and utility is zero when caught manipulating, the objective is
honest grading ef f ort When utility is linear: U ( h τ h p h ) = α h τ h p h , the FOC for the optimal p j can be
Comparative statics
] dp j = 0, implies equation (3) in the text dp
More generally, dividing by s and solving for the optimal p j yields a FOC for item j that can be written:
where the equation is multiplied by
, we obtain dp
.
This is negative if the denominator is positive
a sufficient condition for which is h (p) < 0, satisfied by commonly used log-linear preferences.
We then have
so that dp j ds is negative. This implies a negative score gradient in class size
Nonlinear disutility of effort
Returning to a model with linear utility of scores, suppose grading effort generates disutility through a nonlinear function, C (s − n j ), for j = 1, . . . J. In this case, what matters to sign dp j ds is how the curvature of the cost function compares to the disclosure risk γ(s). Assuming additive across-items costs, the maximand can be divided by s to obtain
The optimal p j satisfies
which implies dp
For example, when the cost of honest grading is quadratic and convex
(with positive β 1 and β 2 ) we have C (x) = β 1 + 2β 2 x and C (x) = 2β 2 , so that dp
Equation (3) in the text is obtained as special case when β 2 = 0. The last expression is negative if
The sign of dp j ds is unclear, although for small enough β 2 and large enough γ (s) is most likely negative. A cost function with small curvature with respect to the utility gain (α
is a sufficient condition for dp j ds < 0. Costs might also be concave if honest graders become more efficient when they grade more (negative β 2 ). In this case, a similar condition can be derived to sign dp j ds . Notes: Columns 1-3 report first stage estimates of the effect of the Maimonides' Rule, a monitor at institution and dummies for grade enrollment being in a 10 percent window below and above each cutoff on class size. Columns 4-9 show first stage estimates of the effect of the Maimonides' Rule, a monitor at institution and dummies for grade enrollment being in a 10 percent window (2 students) above and below each cutoff on score manipulation. All models control for a quadratic in grade enrollment, segment dummies and their interactions. The unit of observation is the class. Robust standard errors, clustered on school and grade, are shown in parentheses. Control variables include: percent female students, percent immigrants, percent fathers at least high school graduate, percent employed mothers, percent unemployed mothers, percent mother NILF, grade and year dummies, and dummies for missing values in these variables. All regressions include sampling strata controls (grade enrollment at institution, region dummies and their interactions). Codice plesso: Livello:
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